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Abstract 
The subject of this thesis is the development of discourses of justification for US military actions after the 
Cold War. When the Soviet Union fell the United States lost its main adversary. For US officials, defending 
the world against communist influences could no longer sufficiently serve as justification for US military 
action. However, US military activity continued. The US is inclined to go to war, on small and large scales. 
This thesis critically analyses discourse of military justification transmitted by US officials, how these 
discourses developed after the Cold War and how they attempted to win the public opinion. This thesis is 
mainly written from a constructivist perspective, which treats language not merely as a transfer of 
information, but also as a creator of social realities. The purpose of the language analyzed in this thesis is 
to create sturdy public support so that wars can be protracted for an extended amount of time. I focus on 
three conflicts and their accompanying discourse. The first one is the Invasion of Panama, the first true 
post-Cold War military action by the US. The second and third conflicts are the Invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001 and the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both these conflicts were communicated as a being a part of the 
Global War on Terror. I conclude that the reasoning behind US military intervention seems to be very fluid 
and changes over time, but that the long-term inclination towards military intervention remains 
unchanged. It seems that the connection between military political discourse and actual policy is 
ambiguous at the least. From a normative standpoint it should be questioned if this is acceptable when it 
comes to world-shaping events such as military conflict.  
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Introduction  
A popular statement is that the United States military budget is larger than the military budget of the next 
seven countries combined. This statement is not a hyperbole. At present, the US Navy deploys twelve 
extremely powerful nuclear aircraft-carriers, with a new generation upcoming, that are not matched by 
any other nation. Is war an integral part of US foreign policy and has it always been that way? In this thesis 
I aim to delve deeper into the question of this ‘American Militarism’, especially into the development and 
implications of official discourse that is propagated by the US Government regarding the deployment of 
military personnel. It would be expected that the end of the Cold War would bring about a decrease of 
military activity since proxy wars would have become less prevalent and because of the diminished 
imminent threat of the Soviet Union. However, Western countries are often seen at the heart of the 
ongoing instability in the Middle-East, with a central position occupied by the US.1 The same goes for Latin 
America, in which the U.S. has been extremely active throughout the Cold War but still remains active in 
different manners.2  
From a Cold War perspective, it makes sense for the US to maintain a somewhat interventionist 
doctrine: The Cold War world was a bipolar world, with two opposing superpowers, wherever the US 
would lose its influence, the SU would likely gain it. The Truman doctrine was a clear statement, albeit 
implicit, to the world: wherever countries came under threat of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian rule 
the US would do everything in its power to assist peoples in maintaining their freedom and independence. 
He proclaimed: “The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow 
in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better 
life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in 
maintaining their freedoms.”3 
The perspective described by Truman is often used as the foundation when the subject is US policy 
during the Cold War. However, according to Doug Stokes this perspective of the Cold War is somewhat 
orthodox. He proposes a revisionist view on US policy in the Cold War. Such a view has two distinct 
advantage, according to Stokes. Firstly, it is capable of providing a more nuanced explanation of the 
underlying motives of the US policy towards the Global South. Revisionists ascribe a larger role to the 
political economy of the US for Cold War policy, rather than of a policy that was mainly driven by security 
                                                          
1 Berch Berberoglu, Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instalibilty, (New York 1999), 111-
114. 
2 See Alan L. McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945 (Washington 
2006). 
3 Henry S. Truman, ‘Adress Before Joint Session of Congress’, 1947. 
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threats. The argument that follows from this is that the “primary threat to US interests during the Cold 
War came from any form of independent development in the Third World and not just from communist 
forces allegedly linked to the Soviet Union.”4 Secondly, an unorthodox interpretation of US policy in 
the Cold War era provides an alternative collection of insights on which post-Cold War US foreign policy 
can be based. If the political economy is seen as a driving factor of the US during the Cold War, the post-
Cold War US foreign policy becomes a very clear continuation of the Cold War policy, albeit without clear 
presence of a counter ideology.5 The goal of the US after the Cold War, just as it was during the Cold War, 
is the preservation of global capitalism with USA as the leading nation.      
In this thesis I set out to challenge the orthodox historical interpretation of the post-Cold War policy. I 
will focus on US military foreign policy and will evaluate and explain the seemingly intrinsic US tendency 
to deploy troops overseas. In doing so I hope to contribute to a more differentiated vision on the policy 
discourses surrounding war and military intervention. The US military, I this thesis, is seen as an 
instrument to project power and secure interests, whether from a security standpoint or from an 
economic standpoint. Therefore, military action is a clear indicator of policy direction when it comes to 
issues that concern national interest.  To support a more unorthodox historical account of the post-Cold 
War policies I aim to present a Constructivist account of the post-Cold War justifications given for three 
post-Cold War military interventions: the invasion of Panama, and the Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as 
part of the Global War on terror. I will research several key speeches delivered by George H. W. Bush and 
George W. Bush. For the analysis of these texts I will be utilizing the methodology of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), as described by Norman Fairclough. This methodology emphasizes the ‘meaning-making’ 
of language and their relationship with (constructed) social realities. A part of CDA is the normative aspect 
of policy and by analyzing discourse, the methodology can help in opening perspectives of ‘rights’ and 
‘wrongs’ within society.6 The question I will be answering in this thesis is as follows: How did the discourses 
of justification of military action develop from the end of the Cold War until and including the Global War 
on Terror? 
In my analyses, the justifications of US military actions seem have a very fluid nature. The messages 
that are transmitted to the audiences change over time and seem to follow what is most convincing rather 
than what is true. When it comes to justification of war, governments are always looking for frames and 
how to transmit these to their audiences.7 In a Constructivist sense there is no essential meaning to facts, 
                                                          
4 Doug Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia, (London 2005), 21. 
5 Ibidem, 21-22. 
6 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (Second Edition London 2010) 7. 
7 Jim A. Kuypers, Bush’s War: Media Bias and Justifications for War in a Terrorist Age (Lanham 2006), 15. 
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but they “take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives 
them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others.”8 Directly after the Cold War 
it became ‘democracy promotion’, after that Clinton’s ‘humanitarian approach’ appeared, at first the 
American public were behind this. After their loss in the battle of Mogadishu, (Black Hawk Down), the 
American people started to put question marks at this discourse as well. After Clinton, 9/11 happened, a 
new discourse: global war on terror. Initially the people support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but this 
discourse also became worn-out. Here the power of frames can be seen in action. At first when the frame 
is transmitted it is able to shape the general perception of the conflicts and the necessities of intervention, 
but when these frames are worn out, other frames will take over, some of which will be challenging the 
initial framing. The use of military force rarely stabilizes political situation, and if they do, it is impossible 
to foresee for how long and how structural the stabilization will prove to be.9 This makes the fluid and 
ambivalent nature of discourse of military justification the ´wrong´ that I try to point out.  
I will analyze four speeches on post-Cold War conflicts: the first text is a speech is given by George H. 
W. Bush, he addresses the nation on the fact that he ordered the US military to invade Panama the night 
before. The second is a speech by Secretary Baker, also on Panama but some months after the initial 
invasion. The third and fourth speech are the Afghanistan ultimatum speech given by George W. Bush, 
shortly after 9/11 and is the Iraq Ultimatum speech given by George W. Bush in 2003. My goal in analyzing 
these speeches is to emphasize the fluidity of the discourse that accompanies these military actions and 
that ultimately are also a basis for US’s allies to join their military actions or not.  
I argue that the post-WWII justification discourse trends can roughly be divided into three genres or 
frames: firstly, a Cold War doctrine, with a concrete and powerful  adversary, the USSR was often times 
reason enough to make military actions justified or even necessary. The second doctrine gained more 
ground after the Cold War: the nobility doctrine. The US with all its might want to bring peace, stability 
and democracy to the rest of the world and does not scare away from the sacrifices that are needed to 
achieve this. The third doctrine is that of anti-terror: a doctrine based on global security and the imminent 
threat that is posed by large and small (foreign) underground organizations (and sometimes regimes as 
well) on which the US military must respond swiftly and decisively. The doctrine of nobility and the 
doctrine of anti-terror are used simultaneously on different occasion, when it is best suited to the situation 
at hand. The bottom-line is the same: American (-led) military intervention. 
                                                          
8 William A. Gamson, ‘News as Framing Comments on Graber’ The American Behavioral Scientist 33 (1989) 2, 157 in 
Jim A. Kuypers, Bush’s War. 
9 Rory Stewart and Gerard Knaus, Can Intervention Work? (New York 2012). 
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1. Theoretical framework 
One of the central assumptions to this thesis is that there is a certain American Militarism. In The New 
American Militarism Andrew J. Bacevich defines American Militarism as follows: “The global military 
supremacy that the United Stated presently enjoys-and is bent on perpetuating-has become central to 
[American] national identity. More than America’s matchless material abundance or even the effusions 
of its pop culture, the nation’s arsenal of high-tech weaponry and soldiers who employ that arsenal have 
come to signify who we are and what we stand for.”10 The notion of American militarism implies that the 
tendency to employ military power globally is something of an accepted status quo by both Americans 
themselves but also other countries worldwide. It maintains that not many countries or even the UN truly 
oppose or forbid the US to act militarily. The violations of international law that have been committed by 
the US the last several decades go by unpunished, while similar violations committed by so-called ‘rogue 
states’ are used by the US as incentive to intervene. The classical Realist approach to the US’s position 
within the international relations framework is that the US defends its powerful position and its policies 
are geared towards supporting their own might and to push the balance of power in their own favor. In a 
Realist sense the different U.S. doctrines will always be seen as an instrument of power and influence. By 
supporting anti-communists, the U.S. would ensure their ideology would end up dominant and in doing 
so they were spreading the influence of the U.S. This can be said of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall 
plan and even the US involvement in both world wars.  
Although the Realist approach is very efficient in laying bare the different power structures and their 
interactions, it is inclined to give a somewhat one-sided account of reality. Its perspective is that of the 
politician, or that of the decision maker. Realists can take the words and the explanations of the how and 
why for granted. From the beginning of the United States as a country until today, the framing of enemies 
and allies alike has had a large role in shaping the policies that were implemented by US government 
bodies. After all, the Monroe Doctrine dates back to 1823 and it states that the New World is superior to 
the Old World. The term Old World can of course be loosely handled and applied on every area that is not 
to the US’s liking. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has been active on the world’s 
military stage. But after every major conflict, the U.S. always dramatically decreased the size of their 
military in a relatively short amount of time. This was the case in the Civil War, The First World War and 
the Second World War. It has, however, not been the case after the end of the Cold War. Instead, the 
military spending has been gradually increasing. Mainstream IR has also been criticized for being in favor 
                                                          
10 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, (Oxford 2013) 1. 
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of the State. Within (mainstream) IR Theory there is still little room for critical analysis, as Herman Schmid 
argued in 1968 when writing on peace research: that it is “[…]a factor supporting the status quo of the 
international power structure.”11 
1.1 Constructivism 
While the mainstream theoretical body of IR is still Realism, Constructivism has gained influence in the 
past several decades as well. Its main premise is that international politics are dominated by social 
constructions.12 It regards international politics as consisting of a framework of socially and culturally 
constructed truths, that together, form the basis from which decisions are made. Constructivism differ 
from (neo-)realism in that it defies the notion of one objective reality in which international politics 
unfolds; it tries to understand change rather than status quo on the international level. Secondly, 
constructivists emphasize the social dimension, like language, norms, values and rules, of international 
politics. Thirdly, Constructivism claims that the world of international politics is a world made by us; the 
human interaction of the created reality is paramount. These human interactions can bring social, 
historical and political realities into being.13  
If the notion of ‘security threat’ is taken as an example: a western Realist who sees Iranian missile silos 
on satellite images would call this a threat to the West. Their reasoning is as follows: the Iranian 
government is not to be trusted and destructive instruments like ICBMs should be kept out of their hands 
at all costs. A constructivist however, would see the threat of a ICBMs attack by Iran as a socially 
constructed threat, borne out of the socially constructed reality of the differences between the countries 
(and hemispheres) and the incompatibility that result from them. The threat is what you make of it, so to 
speak. After all: missile silos located in France would not be perceived as a threat by most of the Western 
countries. 
Constructivism as a perspective brings both virtues and dangers. The virtues of this perspective is that 
it focuses on different aspects of IR than the more mainstream theories (although Constructivism has 
become somewhat mainstream itself), thus it can deliver novel explanations that would otherwise have 
been overlooked. Constructivism is generally seen as a more critical perspective and when writing about 
the influence on the world by United States militarism and the used discourse, such a critical perspective 
can be very helpful. The danger is that constructivist explanations have a tendency to remain somewhat 
vague and have difficulty to ascent towards a clear theoretical and factual transparency. As a theoretical 
                                                          
11 Herman Schmid, ‘Peace Research and Politics, Journal of Peace Research 5 (1968) 3, 217-232, 229 
12 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith, International Relations Theory (Oxford 2013) 189. 
13 Ibidem. 
9 
 
mode of thought, Constructivism “[occupies] a ‘middle’ position between rationalism and reflectivism”.14 
It is a perspective that seeks to conceptualize the relationship between the material and the discursive, 
but this relationship is difficult to conceptualize.15As Constructivism takes language as a focal point for 
political analyses, it can provide a critical analysis on political discourse. In the case of military justification 
discourses it emphasizes the question of the way in which the constructed nature of social reality can be 
exploited by state-elites through the usage of certain language or the decided framework from which 
military action is presented. 
For this thesis, Constructivism can deliver an analysis that does not necessarily explicitly addresses the 
truths and untruths of military political discourse but rather addresses the question of how did the conflict 
became possible.16  For instance, the question of truths and untruths with regards to the US invasion of 
Iraq is intrinsically slippery as it is impossible to find out what the ‘true’ intention was, it is impossible to 
look inside of the heads of those who were involved in the decision-making. A debate on what the ‘real’ 
motive was, would ultimately boil down to a “battle of interpretation”.17 Constructivism can look at what 
was said, and how the discourse was generated and what it ultimately seemed to ‘construct’ or add to the 
socially constructed reality of a general sentiment. In the case of Iraq, the alleged possession of WMDs 
and the alleged connection to 9/11 constructed the sentiment that a US invasion in Iraq was justified, if 
not necessary. If political discourse is approached from this perspective it can be emphasized how stated 
reasons can become almost synonyms to causes, which greatly reduces historical complexity, but it also 
reduces historical accuracy. 
1.2 Critical Geopolitics  
Related to Constructivism is an approach called Critical Geopolitics. Critical geopolitics is a subfield of 
political geography. Critical geopolitics can “[…] investigate how the categorizations and cultural creations 
through which we come to understand and write in turn shape our political existence.”18 Classical 
geopolitics, as a subfield of geography mainly deals with the spatiality: it is ‘the politics of places’.19 Critical 
geopolitics tries ascend the purely spatiality of the global politics by focusing on the social aspect of power, 
rather than physical and spatial domination. Critical geopolitics criticizes modern geography in that it has 
                                                          
14 Nazya Fiaz, ‘Constructivism meets critical realism: Explaining Pakistan’s state practice in the aftermath of 9/11’, 
European Journal of International Relations 20 (2014) 2, 491-515, 494. 
15 Ibidem. 
16 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith, International Relations Theory, 198. 
17 Ibidem.  
18 Simon Dalby, Creating the Second World War: The Discourse of Politics (London 2016) 173. 
19 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (Second Edition London 2005) 113. 
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“remained remarkably blind to the politics of its own gaze and geographical history for so long.”20 In this 
thesis the politics of places is mainly focused on the kind of regimes that these places have. By employing 
this tactic whole regions can be generalized by the fact that, for instance, their governments are not 
democratic like ‘ours’. 
The influence of the United States as a superpower is enormous. The US has been highly active from 
Africa to South America and from the Middle East to Asia. Many scholars and media seemed to take this 
role for granted. In IR not many scholars seem to directly oppose the way in which the US handles global 
politics and foreign policy. Of course, individual presidents and individuals will be criticized but the 
common thread that has been the main part of US foreign policy seems to be left alone. Now, one could 
say that it is not the job of the IR scholar to be squarely critical towards a single country. But when a single 
country has such an influence on the shape of the political landscape worldwide, that statement must be 
reconsidered. Critical geopolitics reconsiders this statement in a way: it serves as a reminder how the 
mere locality of a country can be of influence on the way in which it is viewed. For instance, the 
international reaction to the crisis in Rwanda was somewhat indifferent, it was too little and above all too 
late.21 Would a similar crises have occurred in France, for example, the world would have reacted in a 
completely different manner.  
1.3 Securitization theory 
Securitization theory is the theory that upholds that issues can become securitized over time.  The 
securitization of certain issues can push these issues higher on the priority list than they would otherwise 
‘organically’ maintain. First coined by Ole Weaver in 1995, securitization is a 
 
[…] speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object and 
declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off. The issue 
is securitized -becomes a security issue, a part of what is security- if the relevant audience accepts 
this claim and thus grants the actor a right to violate rules that otherwise would bind.22 
 
                                                          
20 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 44. 
21 Alan J. Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’, International 
Studies Quarterly (2008) 52, 49-80, 74.  
22 Ole Waever, ‘The EU as a Sovereign Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-sovereign Security 
Orders,’ in Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams, eds., International Relations Theory and the Politics of European 
Integration: Power, Security and Community (London: Routledge, 2000), 251. 
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It is a related of Constructivism as it implies the power of language usage when it comes to policy 
decisions. Important to note is that the security issue is not necessarily conceived out of thin air. An 
example of this is the securitization of International Public Health following the perceived increasing 
threat of bioterror, or the securitization of migration, following the perceived threat of not knowing who 
is crossing the border during migration waves.23 Another example, less founded in reality, is the imposing 
of import tariffs on the Steel imports in the US, proposed by President Trump in the name of national 
security. As securitization is seen as a speech-act it must hold some credibility to be accepted by relevant 
audiences. 
When security is placed in a constructivist perspective identity becomes an important factor.  There 
are two strands of Constructivism that have a different conception of the relationship between security 
and identity. Conventional Constructivism is focused on the ways in which national identity influences the 
substance of national interests while Critical Constructivism is more involved with outlining how national 
identity and accompanying paradigms are influential in legitimizing political action.24 Concerning security, 
this thesis is written from the perspective of Critical Constructivism as it is focused around the creation of 
legitimacy through the usage of language. 
 
  
                                                          
23 See Alexander Kelle, ‘Securitization of International Public Health: Implications for Global Health Governance and 
the Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime’, Global Governance 13 (2007) 2, 217-235 ; Philippe Bourbeau, The 
securitization of migration: a study of movement and order, (London 2011). 
24 Paul D. Williams e.d., Security Studies An introduction, (Oxon 2013), 63.  
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2. Methodology 
I this thesis I set out to critically examine an important part of the military foreign policy of the United 
States of America that has been and still is a world-shaping venture. That said, the broadness of this 
subject calls for a research method that focusses on one or more events rather than to try and capture 
the foreign policy in its entirety. Therefore I have chosen for a discourse analysis. A discourse analysis fits 
the theoretical perspective of Constructivism I utilize. It is about the creation of images, of threats and of 
necessities that together justify military action. A fitting, well described methodology of discourse analysis 
is that of critical discourse analysis (CDA). There are multiple different ways in which CDA can be put into 
practice. The approach I will be utilizing in this thesis is a dialectal-relational approach to CDA, coined by 
Normal Fairclough as one form of CDA. In this chapter I will present the methodology I will be using in the 
analysis of a speech given by George Bush on the invasion of Panama and the some relevant texts that 
were published in the Department of State Bulletin in the same month (December 1989). This method 
uses four stages that help build a framework from which texts can be analyzed.  
Stage 1, the Wrong. 
Stage 2, the obstacles in righting this wrong.  
Stage 3, does the social order ‘need’ the social wrong. 
Stage 4, possible ways past the obstacle.25 
CDA is a method that is suitable for bringing a normative element to discursive research. It can reflect on 
what is wrong and what is right. This makes it an interesting approach when dealing with political 
discourse concerning military action. It can help to answer the question whether a nation has the right to 
conduct violent action, with regards to the possible consequences, but also with regard to a possible 
violation of sovereignty, or even international law. It can also help with an analysis on how these actions 
are communicated, how military action is normalized and how the enemy or the purpose of the mission 
is portrayed. It is an approach that tries to look beyond what happened, and why, but rather at how it 
happened. 
  
                                                          
25 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (Second Edition London 2010), 226. 
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Normal Fairclough describes CDA as follows: 
 
1. It is not just analysis of discourse (or more concretely texts), it is part of some form of systematic 
transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process. 
2. It is not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of 
texts. 
3. It is not just descriptive, it is also normative. It addresses social wrongs in their discursive 
aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them.26 
 
CDA is an interdisciplinary methodology and can be used in conjunction with very literal text analyses 
tools, such as counting word-frequencies or assessing the adjectival nature of textual elements. But it can 
also be used in conjecture with a more general text analysis, focusing more on the meanings of the texts 
than on the text itself. Furthermore, it is a method that is concerned with ‘semiotic modalities’.27 These 
modalities include language and imagery. It emphasizes meaning-making and its relational position 
towards actual policy directions. These semiotic modalities can be used by, in this instance, the US 
government. By justifying military actions using semiotic modalities such as liberty, democracy and 
freedom, support among the people is increased. When in other countries these principles are violated, 
their meaning can be utilized to increase support on the basis of a shared humanity.  
Additionally, the dialectical-relational approach is also fitting to the subject of American military action 
because the military action is always accompanied by extensive language usage, whether it is the 
President, performing lengthy speeches, the Congress debating on the steps forward, the press analyzing 
the decisions made and the situations that unfold following American military action or the US allies 
contemplating to join their interventions or not. All this discourse is inevitably not only describing truths 
and untruths, but also creating sentiments. For this thesis I will focus on this meaning-making and how 
the discourse used for the meaning-making of military action abroad developed after the Cold War. 
Fairclough emphasizes that CDA needs to be seen as a methodology, and not as a method. Thus, the 
stages I mentioned above are used largely implicitly as a framework throughout the text. CDA is more 
than “just a matter of selecting from an existing repertoire of methods. It is a theoretical process which 
constructs an object of research (a researchable object, a set of researchable questions) for the research 
                                                          
26 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, 10-11. 
27 Ibidem, 230. 
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topic by bringing to bear on it relevant theoretical perspectives and frameworks.”28. In my thesis this 
object of research is the development of the discourses of justification concerning US military 
intervention, and the function of these discourses that do not seem to inform but rather to influence.  
CDA is problem-oriented and focuses on the relation between discourse, the meaning-making of this 
discourse, and its role in society. The problem with regards to US military policy is that it seems to be able 
to go unopposed, domestically and internationally. The question of military intervention should be 
analyzed more critical and with stricter guidelines, because military intervention can have major 
implications and unforeseen long-term consequences, whether in a Cold War context, a context of 
humanitarian aid, democracy promotion or the context of the global war on terror. It is important to note 
that with the coming and going of a multitude of politically heterogeneous administrations, since WWII 
the overall global policy of intervention has seen little to no change. Whenever strategic interests were 
deemed vital enough, covert meddling and/or military action seems to be the norm, without radically 
questioning the consequences or even the interests of those who vouch for such actions. 
CDA emphasizes the function of language and how the language ties in to socially constructed realities. 
It is a methodology that looks at what ideas (political) discourse attempts to construct, amplify or exploit. 
Related to Constructivism, CDA analyses what underlying messages and images discourses try to transmit. 
Political elites, who are assumed to be knowledgeable of the relevant constructed realities can attempt 
to exploit these constructs and base their justification on it. When liberty as a social institution and a 
cultural pride is taken as an example for US citizens, American presidents can thus utilize the notion of 
liberty to justify military campaigns, in the name of liberty and democracy. 
      
 
 
 
  
                                                          
28 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language 225. 
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3. Critical Discourse Analysis: Invasion of Panama and beyond. 
In the early days of the Cold War the stakes were very clear. In the bipolar world that came after WWII, 
nations all over the world seemed to have two options: either join the US in taking on a capitalist system 
with its free institutions and market, or join the Soviet Union with its communist system that promised 
equality for all. After the fall of the SU, this could no longer serve as a sufficient mode of justification.  
The discourse analysis that follows in the following chapters, is inspired by critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) and is founded in the theories of Critical Geopolitics, Securitization Theory and Constructivism. 
Important aspects of these frameworks are as follows: 
 
1. Critical Discourse Analysis sees the social reality as consisting of both concrete social events and 
abstract social structures. The relation between these is mediated by social practices.  
2. Language constructs realities on which policymakers base their policy. But language is not merely 
reactive but also proactive. 
3. Territorial assumptions have an enormous influence on policy; they are often reified and taken for 
granted without too much thought behind it.   
4. The broadly accepted discursive constructs are utilized by policymakers to justify their decisions. 
5. Securitization is a theory that holds that many issues can be securitized by officials in order to place 
these issues higher on the priority list. The classification of security issues is thus viewed as a fluid concept 
that can be altered at will. 
3.1 Background: Operation Just Cause 
Manuel Noriega, who had been in service of the CIA for several years became de facto leader during 1984 
and enjoyed an increasing level of freedom pursuing his own personal wealth creation. Noriega was a 
drug trafficker, arms dealer and intelligence officer for the CIA. But in 1985, after the brutal murder on 
political activist Hugo Spadafora, which was believed to have been ordered by Noriega, the relation 
between Noriega and the US deteriorated. In the later years of the 1980’s the US-Noriega relationship 
deteriorated even further as the CIA increasingly considered Noriega as a dog off his leash, lending support 
to other intelligence agencies without consulting with the CIA. This came to a climax when Noriega 
blatantly influenced the elections his party seemed sure to lose and remained in power through terror 
and violence in 1989. The partnership with Noriega was in 1988 was described as follows: “The saga of 
Panama's General Manuel Antonio Noriega represents one of the most serious foreign policy failures for 
the United States. Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, Noriega was able to manipulate U.S. policy toward 
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his country, while skill-fully accumulating near-absolute power in Panama.”29 Noriega was known to be a 
drug trafficker for many years but he remained useful to the US, due, in part, to his connections with the 
US backed rebel group called the Contras who were actively opposing the Socialist junta in Nicaragua. 
When the Iran-Contra affair became blew up in 1986 and the Contras could no longer be supported by 
the US, Noriega lost his usefulness to the CIA and suddenly became expendable.30 His history with drug 
trafficking made for a perfect excuse for the US government to join the allegations made by US media and 
voice disapproval of Noriega and his practices. This became most official when the Senate passed 
Resolution 239 on June 26, 1987, calling on Noriega to step down from power.31 The situation in Panama 
had suddenly become a first line issue in the US Senate, and Noriega was now called “not a part of the 
solution- [but] part of the problem.”32 
But Noriega prevailed and remained in power, which was extremely humiliating for the US 
Government.33 They had assisted him in getting on top, but they did not seem to be able to pull him down 
at will. With Noriega, openly being ‘off his leash’ and holding on to power longer than expected, the 
Torijos-Carter treaties that ensured US control over the Panama Canal until the year 2000 became under 
threat as well. Furthermore, the tensions towards the approximately 35,000 US personnel that were 
active in Panama increased. After several incidents President Bush gave the go ahead order for Operation 
Just Cause. On Tuesday, December 19 the number of US troops in Panama was doubled to 26,000. Within 
the week, the military forces of Panama were defeated, disbanded or had surrendered and all military 
objectives were achieved. However, General Noriega had evaded capture and was laying low in an 
unknown location, but was ultimately captured, trialed and detained in America, France and Panama until 
he died in a hospital in Panama City in 2017. 
  
                                                          
29 Kerry Subcommittee Report: Drugs, Law Enforcement And Foreign Policy, retrieved from 
https://archive.org/stream/Kerry-Report-Drugs-
Contras/Drugs%2C%20Law%20Enforcement%20and%20Foreign%20Policy%20%281988%29_djvu.txt, 08-05-2018. 
30 Peter Dale Scott & Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America, (California 
1998) 72. 
31 Orlando J. Perez, Political Culture in Panama: Democracy After Invasion (New York 2011) 78. 
32Congressional Record, Senate 26 June 1987, 17769. 
33 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama (New York 1990), 299. 
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3.2 Genres of Justification 
Securitization is a theory developed by the Copenhagen School. Its area of enquiry is focused on security 
as a speech act: the social construction of security. Within securitization theory, security is not regarded 
as an objective reality, but rather as an outcome of these speech-acts. Issues can become securitized over 
time in order to place them higher on the priority list.  Securitization theory is a critical stance in security 
studies, as it highlights the way in which the security agendas seem to grow broader and broader to 
include more than just state and military security.  With security viewed partly as a speech act, virtually 
anything can be securitized and thus the necessity or the urgency of a certain policy object can be 
manipulated. The US has become very proficient in justifying their military choices towards their own 
people and also to the leaders of other nations, but usually these justifications are given post ante. In the 
case of Operation Just Cause, George H. W. Bush addressed the nation several hours after the operations 
in Panama had started.  
Now follows the actual analyses of two texts regarding the Panama Invasion. The first text is Bush 
addressing the nation to inform that the US army has invaded Panama the previous night and he also 
states the reasons why.34 The text has roughly three different themes which are addressed by the 
president in no particular order. The first theme is practical explanation, what has happened and what 
the casus belli was that set off the events. The corresponding paragraphs are §1, §3, §5 and §7: the first 
describes that Bush ordered for an invasion the night before and the third presents that Noriega, dictator 
of Panama had declared a state of war with the United States and additionally that a number of American 
serviceman were killed or wounded and that one of their wives was threatened and brutally interrogated. 
The fifth paragraph briefly addresses some operational information of the US forces and also emphasizes 
that US personal has behaved itself “courageously and selflessly”, but that some “Americans have lost 
their lives in defense of their fellow citizens”. 
The second theme justification, in §2, §4 and §11. In §2 Bush states what had been the goals of the US 
policy towards Panama in the past several years: 1) safeguard lives of Americans, 2) defend democracy in 
Panama, 3) combat drug trafficking and 4) protect the integrity of the Canal treaty. Additionally, he states 
how, without succeeding, the US has made many attempts to resolve diplomatically, the crisis in Panama. 
In §4 Bush goes deeper into his obligation to safeguarding the 35,000 American citizens that are living in 
Panama. 
                                                          
34 See Appendix 1.  
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The third theme is future addressed in §7, §8, §9, §10 and §12. These paragraphs present a positive 
and opportunistic image of the future of US-Panama relations, and also the relationship with the rest of 
Latin-America. The function of these paragraphs is to sketch the future of Panama-US relationship now 
that Noriega is no longer in charge. George H.W. Bush’s address to the nation on his decision to invade 
Panama sketches a very clear, but also an emotional image. It addresses the Panamanian people and their 
democratically elected leaders as the victims of a terrible autocratic regime. In §3 it is clearly stated by 
Bush that a line was crossed by the autocratic regime of Panama when they “brutally” murdered US 
citizens. The way in which this is framed makes it so that the United States was the party under attack by 
Noriega´s Panama and that the invasion that followed was merely a defensive reaction. Together with the 
assessment of security for US citizens and Panamanian citizens, comes the notion of freedom and 
democracy. This is made clear in §4: “As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives 
of American citizens. And that is why I directed our armed force to protect the lives of American citizens 
in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States”. It also has a role in §6: “The brave 
Panamanians elected by the people of Panama in the elections last May, President Guillermo Endara and 
Vice Presidents Calderon and Ford have assumed the rightful leadership of their country.” From a 
constructivist perspective, these are clear examples of the use of language as a tool for persuasion, trying 
to touch upon the people’s hearts and their devotion to liberty, freedom and humanity. 
Liberty is an important and emotional institution in US society. The Statue of Liberty is a prime example 
of strong semiotic imagery, one that American culture takes great pride in.  It is no coincidence that many 
presidents have used the promotion of liberty, freedom and democracy to justify military action. 
However, if one would try to disconnect itself with the idealistic and ultimately ‘correct’ nature of the 
notion, it becomes clear that the promotion of these values cannot be a driving factor behind the US 
foreign policy. As mentioned before, the times the US has been cooperating with intrinsically 
undemocratic, inhumane and non-liberal parties are many.35 Noriega himself is a prime example; the US 
had known for a very long time that he was involved in illicit business and that his methods of leadership 
were hardly promoting liberty and democracy. The double standard is very apparent, but receives little 
attention. The fact that the popular approval rating of Operation Just Cause was over 80% underlines the 
power of the promotion of Liberty.36 
                                                          
35 See Jan Selby, ‘The Myth of Liberal Peace-building, Conflict, Security and Development 13 (2013) 1, 57-86. 
36 Jane Kellet Cramer, ‘”Just Cause” or Just Politics? U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for 
Diversionary War’, Armed Forces & Society 32 (2006) 2, 178-201, 195. 
19 
 
Each of the four reasons Bush gives in the statement can be placed into a different ‘genre’ of 
explanation. As stated before the reasons are: 1) safeguard lives of Americans, 2) defend democracy in 
Panama, 3) combat drug trafficking and 4) protect the integrity of the Canal treaty. The first reason can 
be seen as a reason of intimate security. By calling into question the safety of fellow Americans Bush tries 
to pull the people’s heartstrings in so that they would be approving of the action, regardless of the 
consequences. He also brings this duty to himself personally: “As President, I have no higher obligation 
than to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our armed force to protect the 
lives of American citizens in Panama, and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States.”  
The second reason fall into the genre of ideology/nobility. In this genre he also states that it is what 
the Panamanian people want: democracy: “The Panamanian people want democracy, peace, and the 
chance for a better life in dignity and freedom. The people of the United States seek only to support them 
in pursuit of these noble goals.” This is a justification that had been used many a times throughout the 
Cold War. In the Cold War democracy was mainly defended or promoted in a divergence to socialism or 
communism, but in Operation Just Cause defending democracy by itself is cited as sufficient justification.  
The third reason is less clear cut, and has some overlap with the first reason as it tries to bring forward 
a sense of urgency and necessity by bringing the conflict in Panama closer into the living rooms of the 
people. It can also be put into the genre of security: there is a drug problem in the US, people suffer from 
this drug problem and many drug related crimes are committed, therefore a grassroots approach to a 
mere fraction of this drug problem is enough justification to deploy an invasion force. It is a prime example 
of securitizing an issue to justify military action. No doubt that the global trafficking of drugs is harmful in 
many ways, but it can hardly be seen as a justification for military action; it is rather an area of enquiry for 
the DEA. By giving drug-trafficking enough gravity to justify military action, it can be said that it is 
securitized; it is pulled into the sphere of national security. The safety of Americans is something that 
every American should consider a cause that is worth fighting for. The relative small-scale drug trafficking 
operation of General Noriega was not nearly influential enough to pose a real danger to any American 
citizen; the security aspect of this justification is called into being by the speech act given by George H. W. 
Bush.  
The fourth reason is from a genre that is most likely closest to the truth most of the time: strategy. The 
Panama Canal is vital for the US government and it is located in a country with a leader who has gone 
rogue and does not answer to the US government anymore. The Panama Canal must be safeguarded and 
20 
 
military deployment is the only way with which US control over the Panama Canal can be ensured. This 
reasoning seemed to be central to the operation.37 However, it was not central to the discourse. 
There is a fifth genre of justification that is less concretely found in the text: vilification. The vilification 
of General Noriega, who had been a close ally of the US throughout the Cold War, permeates the text on 
several occasions. The vilification of Noriega is an example of the double standards employed by the US 
when it comes to foreign policy, but it is also a tool with which the mass media is influenced. The ‘heartless 
criminal’ opposing US interests and threatening US citizens makes for attractive headlines. An example of 
this is CBS’s Dan Rather who called Noriega a “swamp rat” who was “at the top of the list of the world’s 
drug thieves and scams”.38 
These five genres are so different from each other that it is hard to believe that these reasons together 
can form a sturdy basis from which large scale military action can be justified. What it does make clear 
however, is that the Bush administration tried to employ several modes of justification in the first place, 
it is as if they thought: “the more reasons, the better”. The name of the action is the first example of 
meaning-making venture of this speech: Operation Just Cause. It implies that the US is willing to deploy 
large scale military action in the name of justice and humanity. The brutality and the criminality of the 
Noriega regime are seen as a just cause. This tone differs from many Cold War conflicts, wherein American 
interests were paramount, instead of putting a stop to unjust regimes.   
3.3 Probing for support? Democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention 
Operation Just Cause can also be perceived in an alternative manner. Firstly, President Bush was seen 
internationally as somewhat soft handed.39 A large scale military invasion could serve as an extremely 
strong gesture to Latin America, and the rest of the world, that although the Cold War was over, the US 
was not ready to give up its position as a policing nation and remained willing to use its instrumental 
power to remain active on the world stage. Secondly, since the US was planning to continue its foreign 
policy on the basis of its military and economical might, it was looking for a post-Cold War pretext with 
which they could convince congress, the American people and the international community of the 
righteousness of their military intent. This explains why the explanations given by Bush were both so 
concrete but also so heterogeneous. It almost looks like the administration was probing what genre of 
                                                          
37 Glenn J. Antizzo, U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: How to Win America’s Wars in the Twenty-
First Century, (Baton Rouge 2010) 62. 
38 Wassim Daghrir, ‘The Media and Operation Just Cause in Panama’, Journal of Arts & Humanities, 5 (2016) 5, 51-
56, 53. 
39 Jane Kellet Cramer, ‘”Just Cause” or Just Politics’, 179. 
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justification would ultimately best serve its purpose and would convince the masses of the righteousness 
of the operation. 
In an April 1990 New York Times article, doubt is voiced over the fact whether the American citizens 
ever were in real danger, as the military force that was already present in Panama was perceived as large 
enough already to safeguard citizen lives. Secondly, the justifications of anti-drug trafficking are also 
doubted, because the scope and size of the action was in no way proportional to the relatively small size 
of Noriega’s drug operation.40 In other newspapers similar points were made, in a January 1990 article in 
the Chicago Tribune, Stephen Chapman discards all of the four ‘excuses’ given by Bush, however that one 
single reasons did, in some way, prevail: the nobility of the US, that was able and willing to go into lengths 
to right the wrongs of the world and to turn military juntas into exemplar democratic nations, for the good 
of the suffering people.41 Although this article does not imply that this mode of thought is enough 
justification for an invasion, it does end with a somewhat positive note on the whole affair: “the 
Panamanian people may enjoy deliverance from tyranny. No one should mourn these results.”42 
The speech that was used by Bush was merely a quick and shallow address to the nation on why the 
military had invaded a country without it being a real threat. The second text I will analyze can be found 
in the Department of State Dispatch that was released three months after the invasion. In a speech, 
Secretary Baker addresses the World Affairs Council in Dallas. His focal point of the speech is American 
Diplomacy and World Democracy. Bakers starts his text off with quite elaborate observations on the 
concept of democracy. The second part of his text uses these observations to justify and to explain a (at 
that time) recent foreign policy action by the US: the Invasion of Panama, three months prior. 43 Where 
President Bush gave four reasons for the invasion, one of which was democracy promotion, Secretary 
Baker uses the invasion solely as a recent example of democracy promotion. From this can be deduced 
that the reasons behind the invasion were not so clear cut as the president made it seem in the first place. 
At the time, many observers wondered why the US would suddenly display such a, overwhelming use of 
force to arrest a ‘simple’ South American dictator and defeat his relatively small Panamanian Defense 
Forces, with strength of 6000 combatants.44 There has been a long and drawn-out debate on whether 
                                                          
40 Wicker, Tom, ´Overkill in Panama´ New York Times (New York 1990) retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/05/opinion/in-the-nation-overkill-in-panama.html, 25-05-2018. 
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42 Ibidem. 
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Operation Just Cause was a diversionary war, carried out because of domestic factors in the US and 
because of President Bush being known as a somewhat soft-handed leader.45 To this day no true 
consensus has been reached but most authors seem to agree on the facts that 1) lives of American citizens 
in Panama were never truly in danger, 2) Bush was not motivated by democracy-promotion and 3) the 
invasion did not help to combat drug-trafficking in the region. Furthermore, the integrity of the Torrijos-
Carter treaties that would hand over control over the Panama Canal to the Panamanians in 2000 was also 
not threatened by the military dictatorship under Noriega. Noriega was certainly a criminal and the 
country was suffering under his control. In the long run it can be argued that the US invasion has had a 
positive impact on the country’s performance. This analysis however focuses on the discourse that 
accompanied military action at the time and how the given pretexts justifying such actions are hardly ever 
founded in reality. 
The real threat faced by the US on the hands of the Panamanian dictator was questionable at most.46 
Moreover, the US had been supporting many dictatorial regimes in Latin America throughout the Cold 
War and never seemed too concerned with possible violations of the principles of liberty and humanity, 
Guatemala as a prime example. Additionally, General Noriega of Panama himself had been a close ally to 
the Americans throughout the Cold War. The language used by Bush to justify his extreme show of force 
with this invasion seems hardly fitting with the policies employed during the Cold War. So what made the 
Panamanian case a different one? 
The Invasion was a symbolic one as it is seen as the first larger scale military action outside of the Cold 
War framework.47 Outside this framework, democracy promotion would become the new pretext for 
military action. In his address before the World Affairs Council on March 30, 199048, Secretary Baker 
attempts to bring forward the importance of global democracy and how it can help the US as a nation. 
Baker’s four observations on democracy and foreign policy are as follows: firstly, he claims that democracy 
means, for a large part, individual rights and responsibilities. Secondly, that democracy offers political 
legitimacy like no other system does. Thirdly, he states that democracy can be seen as a triangle of 
democratic values, economic progress and basic security. Fourthly, he states that “American foreign policy 
abroad must reflect democratic values.”49 Baker uses the recent large scale military action against Panama 
                                                          
45 Ibidem. 
46 Wassim Daghrir, ‘The United States’ “Realist” Foreign Policy: Operation Just Cause in Panama as a Case Study, 
Journal of Arts & Humanities 5 (2016) 5, 30-36, 33-34. 
47 Wassim Daghrir, ‘The United States’ “Realist” Foreign Policy’, 31. 
48 See Appendix 2. 
49 James Baker, “Democracy and American Diplomacy”, 23. 
23 
 
to bring forward the positive effects of democracy. Positive effects for the countries in question, but also 
positive effects for the world economy, thus for the American economy. 
But after the second large-scale military action made by the Bush administration, the First Gulf War, in 
which Sadam Hussein and his forces were expelled from Kuwait, the notion of democracy promotion was 
touched upon to a lesser extent. In the victory speech given by George Bush on the First Gulf War he is 
less concerned with democracy promotion but is particularly concerned with peace and stability in the 
region. On this matter he is also quite frank to say that for the US the abundance of natural resources in 
is a primary reason for the continuing military presence in the region. What is interesting however is that 
the word democracy is not found a single time in this speech, while a year prior to Gulf War Both Bush 
and Baker emphasized the grave importance of a global democracy and how this would benefit the US 
and the rest of the global economic community. This is another indication that the justifications that are 
given for war are often generalized as being part of ‘a greater plan’. However, it seems that often times 
there is really not a single common thread from military action to military action, not a public one at least. 
For instance: both Afghanistan and Iraq where placed under the banner of the Global War on Terror, while 
in the end only for the war in Afghanistan a strong case can be made that it was in fact waged in service 
of combatting terrorism. I will focus on the War on Terror in the next chapter. 
The key to this analysis is that there are conflicts in which the US and its allies are justified to intervene, 
whether it is from a humanitarian, strategic or security point of view but there are also many military 
interventions that do greater harm than good. Again, Afghanistan and especially Iraq in the early 2000s 
are a prime example of this. There is no single ‘grand goal’ that brings all these intervention together: 
goals like democracy promotion, humanitarian aid and global security are almost interchangeably applied 
by different US administrations. With every new period in US governance new grand goals or small 
variations are devised and tested for effectiveness among the Americans and their allies. In the case of 
Panama, the noble goal of spreading peace and democracy found the most resonance under the media 
and the allies, so it stuck. We can see that Bill Clinton continued this genre of justification, with a slight 
emphasis on the economic aspect of democracy promotion. In the 90s Clinton presented his ‘doctrine of 
enlargement’. 
   
This doctrine, based on the idea of expanding the community of market democracies around the 
world, embraced free trade, multilateral peacekeeping efforts and international alliances, and a 
commitment to intervene in world crisis situations when practical (i.e., with little risk and low cost 
in U.S. lives) and morally defensible. The policy promoted an activist role for America and was 
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designed to extend and protect basic human and civil rights insofar as it was within the power of 
the United States to successfully achieve those goals without undermining national security or 
depleting national resources.50 
 
The fact that the early years of Clinton’s foreign policy is similar to the second genre as described 
above: ideology/nobility or, democracy promotion further supports the perspective of the Bush’s address 
to the nation as a speech-act designed to probe which genre of justification would be most persuasive. 
From the first days of his presidential campaign to his time in office, Clinton stressed the importance of 
democracy promotion. In fact, it was one of the three pillars of his grand strategy to address the post-
Cold War world.51 However, this genre of justification lost some of its weight after the disaster that was 
The Battle for Mogadishu, in Somalia 1992.52 When several American servicemen lost their lives and were 
desecrated on the streets of Mogadishu, the American public started to question whether humanitarian 
and ideological justifications for military action were sufficient purpose for American sacrifice. This 
resulted in the US not getting involved with any action in Africa altogether for several years thereafter.53 
Only in Bosnia, 1995, the US and NATO conducted airstrikes and in 1999, again airstrikes in Kosovo. The 
mass killings that occurred in Rwanda, however, were not reason enough for the US or the UN to take 
preventive action, perhaps because the country of Rwanda did not fit the doctrine of enlargement, even 
though a Rwandan military intervention would have been very much morally defensible. 
3.4 Constructivist perspective and liberal peace 
The main argument that is produced by the discourse analysis I carried out is the following: The words 
used by US officials before, during or after large scale military action are not primarily chosen to explain 
what the US military is going to do, is doing or has done. The words are rather chosen to create the utmost 
support among US public and the allies, while attempting to provide justifications that are not too far 
from being truthful and/or credible. As mentioned, the Invasion of Panama was and is seen by some as a 
diversionary war: a war that is designed and carried out to divert attention from failing (domestic) policy.54 
If the assumptions is made that the Operation Just Cause as a diversionary war, the four reasons first 
presented by Bush were not intended to give an honest answer to the question of military deployment, 
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casualties, collateral damage and costs. They were intended to construct a new post-Cold War form of 
general acceptance of global military deployment by the US. 
A constructivist approach comparable to the above was coined by James M. Skelly in 2002. He wrote 
that the general approach to Peace Studies had been hindered by its “attempts to mimic the 
methodological approaches of international relations and political science while valorizing marginal 
position within those disciplines.”55 Skelly also refers back to an earlier (1988) article by himself and Hugh 
Mehan, in which they advocated a more discursive approach of international relations.56 In this paper they 
take the Nuclear Peace as an example of a ‘war-like’ relation that is primarily conducted in talks, 
negotiations and discursive performances. This political discourse “responds to something, objects to 
something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and seeks support”.57 Mehan and Skelly 
apply this to define Cold War negotiations between the two superpowers of the world but it can easily be 
transferred to the Post-Cold War political performance that was the announcement of the Invasion of 
Panama. As mentioned before, the four reasons for the Invasion of Panama can be seen as probing the 
audience of the Bush administration in order to find out what genre of justification would provide the 
most support. The merits of a constructivist approach to the study of peace and war are also outlined by 
Skelly: “If political discourse is made a part of political action, and vice versa, the ability to cloak violence 
through the use of language is significantly lessened.”58  
Another benefit of a constructivist approach, when used to describe and analyze the ongoing Western 
wars on foreign soils and the accompanying discourse, is that it provides an angle from which the notion 
of the liberal peace can be challenged. Simply put: the liberal peace thesis is the notion that democracies 
do not fight other democracies.59 The problem with the liberal peace thesis is that it provokes a sentiment 
of moral righteousness and peacefulness among the Western countries. To a certain extent this moral 
righteousness can be defended: the West takes great pride in their individual freedom, their functional 
democracies, their technological advancements, their societal equality and their general prosperity. 
Countries that do not fit these descriptions can, in a critical geopolitical fashion, be placed in a space of 
inferiority in people’s minds. Wars against such ‘places’ are more easily justifiable. The thought process 
can be described as such: “it is their fault that they are not democracy, would they have been a democracy 
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and we would not need to fight them, because the liberal peace thesis forbids it.” The wrongs that are 
committed in those countries by the hands of democracies become less important. Or at least, their 
importance or media-relevance is not as long-lasting to become susceptible to structural change. When 
dissecting, in a constructivist manner, political discourse that contains justifications for military action 
outside of this ‘liberal peace space’, the reality of distant war and violence and the slipperiness of Western 
motives can be brought closer to the (Western) audience once more. Some argue that the liberalism and 
the actions resulting from it should rather be seen as doctrine that perpetrates ‘ferocious violence with 
which it deploys techniques to penetrate and organize the dispositions of liberal subjects themselves”.60 
In 1995 Thomas Risse-Kappen argued that “Democracies are Janus-faced. While they do not fight each 
other, they are frequently involved in militarized disputes and wars with authoritarian regimes.” He 
further argues that these empirical findings are under-theorized.61       
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4. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Global War on Terror 
After two terms of Clinton presidency, George W. Bush was elected president in 2001. Bush was in the 
difficult position of reacting to the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, the deadliest attack on US 
soil since Pearl Harbor, which was coincidently often used as a form of meaning-making in and of itself.62 
The first country that was invaded by the US in reaction to 9/11 was Afghanistan, were al-Qaeda and 
Osama Bin Laden where located. Thus, the Invasion of Afghanistan was a direct reaction to the 9/11 
attacks.63 In a speech delivered to congress ten days after the attacks, George Bush said the following: 
“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” Thus the Global War on Terror began. He 
made sure to include the entire world in this new American venture by saying: “Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” A month later 
Afghanistan was initially invaded by the US and the UK.  
4.1 Bush addressing the Global War on Terror       
Two years later, on 18 march 2003, Bush presented Saddam Hussein and Iraq with an ultimatum.64 In a 
threatening speech from the Cross Hall in the White house he informed that the US would be ready to 
invade Iraq if their demands were not met. The most important demand was the removal of Saddam 
Hussein from power. The word terror, terrorists or terrorism are used ten times in total in this speech. 
Although Bush does not necessarily present Hussein as a terrorist himself, he does convey him as a 
terrorist supporter and leader of a ‘terror state’. The other important justification that passes the revue 
in this speech is the alleged Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which he also 
connects to a looming terrorist threat for the US and its allies.   
It is striking how the definition of terrorism was somewhat broadened in his ultimatum speech to Iraq 
in comparison to the definition of terrorism he utilized shortly after 9/11 in his speech concerning the 
responsibility of Afghanistan in relation to 9/11. Ten days after the attacks, it seemed that Bush wanted 
to introduce the world to organized Islamic terrorism. He presented it as being a worldwide network of 
Islamic terrorist cells, all underground organizations: “Al-Qaeda is to terror, what the mafia is to crime. 
But its goal is not making money; its goal I remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people 
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everywhere”.65 This speech was noticeably more focused on terrorist organizations worldwide, with al-
Qaeda as its main subject. However, Bush also briefly mentioned that governments who support or harbor 
terrorists were also the target of the coming Global War on Terror: “Our enemy is a radical network of 
terrorists, and every government that supports them.” In the Iraq Ultimatum speech, the focus is shifted 
from the terrorist organization, to the terrorism on a governmental level, in this case Iraq.  
Like the justification concerning the Invasion of Panama, the justifications given in the Iraq Ultimatum 
Speech, can also be divided into different genres. The genre that is given most attention this time is 
security. According to the speech, Bush is certain that Iraq is in possession of WMD’s and that there is a 
real threat of these either being used against the US or other countries by Iraq, or that these weapons will 
be given to terrorist organizations. 
This brings me to the second genre of justification: the global war on terror. Introduced in the 
aforementioned 9/11 speech, it highly focuses on the threat of Islamic terrorist organization: “These 
terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope 
that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, 
because we stand in their way.” In the Iraq Ultimatum Speech, Bush claims that the Hussein regime has 
aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al-Qaeda.” The genre of Global War on The 
genre of terrorism can be seen as an extension of security, but it makes it more concrete and tangible and 
above all: highly emotional because it reaches back to the trauma of 9/11. It also creates the notion that 
wars that are fought in the name of the Global War on Terror are defensive rather than offensive. With 
regards to Iraq, the ties to al-Qaeda and the 9/11 far from clear and these allegations have been called 
into question ever since. Some even claiming that most Islamic terrorist threatening the US were from the 
US’s closest allies, rather than from states deemed ‘sponsors of terror’ by the US. 66 In 2005, Pape even 
claimed that between 1995 and 2003, none of Bush’s Terrorist States (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan, pre-
2001 Afghanistan) produced a single al-Qaeda suicide attacker that conducted an attack against the US. 
The third genre that can be recognized in this speech is again that of liberty. When announcing the 
coming war against Iraq Bush calls it liberation, calling back to the liberation of Europe, the heroic history 
of WWII. Lastly, the genre of peace is touched upon. The US is presented as being at the front of a 
movement that seeks world peace, a movement whose main instrument is war. Peace in this sense is 
presented as the positive opposite of a world in which dictatorial regimes have possession of WMD’s and 
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the willingness of using these weapons and their alleged ties to terrorist organization. Thus, it is also a 
certain conception of security, global security. It can be called the securitization of world peace. A 
dangerous proposition, as world peace is something the world has never seen and will perhaps never 
see.67 To take world peace as a justification for war is to advocate infinite warfare. The power of terms 
like world peace should not be underestimated. In a utilitarian sense, much harm, damage and violence 
can morally be defended when it is perpetrated in the name of World Peace. In a sense, world peace is a 
concept that should not be pursued by world leaders with the might of militaries at their disposal. 
4.2 Constructivist perspective  
In the past two decades the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their consequences have been tiresomely 
analyzed, explained and researched. There are no final answers to the questions asked by researchers, 
public speakers and citizens, but everyone seems to agree on one thing: the consequences were far 
reaching and the event literally changed the world. Many of today’s wars and conflicts are in some ways 
related to the attacks on New York and Washington.68 One of the most striking features of the war on 
terror is that it has never proven to be effective in eliminating global terrorism in any way.69 Still leaders 
and nations around the globe insist on spending enormous sums of money and sacrificing soldier and 
civilian alike to combat the very phenomenon it seems to just make even worse. It is like fighting a fire by 
throwing petrol on the hottest point. When we consider that Islamist terrorism presently is thought to be 
the most prevalent or influential form of terrorism (certainly by politicians), it seems unreasonable to 
wage war (once again) in the Middle-East, the birthplace of many of the largest global Islamist terrorist 
organizations. When a basic understanding of the dynamics of a-symmetrical warfare is presumed and 
how threatened underdogs will always scurry for the cover of anonymity and wage war from the 
underground, the post-9/11 decisions to intensify violent conflict and Western military presence in Islamic 
nations is baffling. 
It is not surprising that the 9/11 attacks have spawned an enormous amount of conspiracy theories as 
they have served to justify a multitude of far-reaching domestic and foreign policy reforms, that have 
handily resulted in an even larger US military presence around the world. The war on terror showcases 
the discursive power of ‘a common enemy’. The ventures that are related to the war on terror had brought 
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the NATO countries closer together once again, as their dependency to each other but mostly their 
dependency on the US military has been growing ever since the onset of the global War on Terror.70 
The rhetoric used by George W. Bush after 9/11 was strong at the least. His famous words “either you 
are with us, or you are with the terrorists” are a prime example of this. Three days prior that speech a 
‘joint resolution’ named the Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) was passed by congress. The 
resolution decreed that “[…] the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter 
and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States […]”.71 In the second section it 
specified that this resolution was mainly designed for an easier deployment of US troops world-wide: “the 
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” The tone 
used by the President Bush showcased a hunger for war and revenge. The resolution, but also the claims 
made by Bush addressing Congress seem to be designed in such a way that a broad range of interpretation 
or liberty of policy direction is possible. For instance: “From this day forward, any nation that continues 
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” Such claims can 
pave the way for a misuse of intelligence. The CIA only needs to ‘prove’ that a certain nation is affiliated 
with terrorism, and all of a sudden, the US and its allies have the ‘right’ to stampede in with drones or 
boots on the ground.72 In a Realist sense, the discursive qualities of these messages would boil down to 
the material need for security, to challenge those who challenge the United States, or more broadly, the 
West. Policy makers inspired by Realist thought see a serious thread and feel the need to take action. 
What it fails to take into account, however, is the social and cultural circumstances in which 1) terrorism 
and anti-Americanism takes place, and 2) what long-term consequences can result from ‘Realist policy’, 
such as military operations abroad. It showcases how easily the American society is moved into military 
action when foreigners are the ones to conduct even a relatively small-scale attack on US soil.  
Another virtue of viewing these statements in a constructivist perspective is that it should be obvious 
that speaking in absolutes, powerful as it may be, lack, per definition, any form of nuance. Statements like 
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“you are either with us or against us” serves the sole purpose of muting any ally who would rather have 
a more distant and well-thought-out approach to the problem of international terrorism. The thought that 
the terrorists maybe wanted the US to invade Muslim countries was given little heed.73 The thought that 
the US was actually provoked by the al-Qaeda to once again attack Middle-Eastern countries was never 
mentioned in the emotional times right after the 9/11 attacks. If such thoughts would be vocalized back 
than the broader debate on the correct course of action would have been more prevalent. A constructivist 
account of terrorism tells us that terrorism is a performative action. It has a social message, a design to 
instill fear, project power or to provoke a nation (or other groups) into acting. Hardly ever is it an actual 
attack in the sense of structurally damaging society and its dynamics.  
4.3 US Interests 
To answer the question why the War on Terror was not reconsidered in a more nuanced and less Realist 
fashion it is important to note what the biggest direct consequences were of the war on terror. Some of 
these consequences were foreseen, other were unforeseen. The two largest direct consequences that 
evolved from the war on terror were the war in Afghanistan, beginning in 2001 (Operation Enduring 
Freedom), and the war in Iraq, beginning in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom). For an answer to this 
question we can take a look at one of the central and apparently eternal motives behind US foreign policy. 
The American foreign policy of the 20th century is often described as isolationist in the interwar period, to 
internationalist in the period after WWII. However even with the revival of the notion of American 
isolationism under Trump, the actual truthfulness of it increasingly challenged by a number of authors.74 
It is questioned whether the US was ever truly isolationist in the first place. 
The US never was economically isolated, but neither was it militarily isolated. Between the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919) and the Attack on Pearl Harbor (1943), the US had a military presence in Nicaragua, Haiti, 
and Dominican Republic and even in Russia. Although the militaristic nature of US foreign policy 
involvement really took off after WWII, they were by no means absent in the interwar period. Even the 
relative calm of the Clinton administration saw military action in Somalia (inherited from the Bush 
administration), the Invasion of Haiti, a bombing campaign in Bosnia and a bombing campaign in Kosovo. 
These were all relatively small scale however, so the Global War on Terror and how it was critical for 
homeland security was a perfect discourse to once again, deploy the US army on a larger scale. The 
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constructivist perspective on these speeches by Bush looks further than the presented goals and threats. 
It recognizes the attempts of spreading ideas, value systems and emotions as a semiotic method of 
meaning-making. Adam Hodges suggested that the War on Terror Discourse created a regime of truth in 
which discursive micro-level interactions are linked to macro-level discourses.75 The result being: a strong 
sense of urgency and validity of the War on Terror, and an initial public approval of large-scale military 
action. 
Looking at justification discourse from a constructivist perspective can bring forward the existence of 
hidden agendas. What these hidden agendas are remains unclear and it is almost impossible to determine. 
Many authors coin the strategic geopolitical importance of an unstable Middle-Eastern region. The 
abundance of oil is often named as the main factor that keeps Western nations so extremely involved in 
the region, as they are afraid of a strong and unified Middle-East that would, in the sense of power politics, 
gain enormous leverage to the rest of the world.76 Others point to the ‘military industrial complex’, for 
which President Eisenhower warned the world in his farewell speech. It is a concept that holds that there 
are many US military industries that greatly benefit from ongoing war and global military involvement by 
the US, and that these industries have immense policy influence.77 
Although, the material interests brought forward by the National Committee on American Foreign 
Policy takes the nobler route, claiming in 2014 that the US material interests in the Middle East include: 
 
- Materially supporting countries and peoples that are well-disposed toward the United States. 
- Materially supporting pro-reform forces in the Arab and Shia Muslim worlds. 
- Preventing the emergence of a hegemonial power from emerging and overwhelming the 
region. 
- Preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability.  
- Preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including the falling 
of such weapons into the hands of extremist movements.   
- Safeguarding the freedom of navigation.   
- Destroying al-Qaeda–linked forces, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  
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- Expanding and deepening U.S. cooperation with Israel in the intelligence, technology, and 
military fields.  
- Promoting a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.78 
 
The interests and goals in the Middle-East pointed out in this list are geared towards the global war on 
terror, security and peace. The only interest that seems to point towards a hidden motive that benefits 
from unrest in the region is that of the prevention of the emerging of a hegemonial power in the region. 
The kind of hegemonial power is not specified in the text but a single hegemonial country, ruling over the 
rest seems to be what is meant, rather than a close cooperation between the countries in the region. 
Another problem with these interest arises with the US focus on deep cooperation with Israel, which will 
always remain a obstacle for when they would want to deepen their cooperation with the Arab states as 
well.        
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4.4 Discussion: total transparency and future interventions  
Now for the final two stages of this version of the Critical Discourse analysis: the third stage asks whether 
the ‘wrong’ is needed for the social order to function.79 The wrong in this analysis refers to the 
interchangeable discourse that accompanies military action, and that somehow, the militarized nature of 
the American footprint on the world seems unable to be changed. When the US seems to go into a calmer 
direction, there is always something that pops up, demanding large military dedication. Even when a 
growing number of voices in America did begin to ask whether the American foreign-policy history was in 
some ways responsible for the attacks on 9/11 and to reconsider the War on Terror, George Bush was 
reelected in 2004, interpreted by many as a mandate to continue in the line they had been heading.80 In 
the previous part of this chapter I argued that the discourse used for justifying military actions do not 
always seemed to be compatible with reality. Different genres of justification are put forward and the one 
that sticks becomes ‘the real one’. Is this a necessity for continuing social order or should a government 
always be truly transparent? 
Total transparency for governments may perhaps not be the best way forward, but when it comes to 
military interventions transparency should be the norm. The cost in human life, material and money and 
the unforeseen consequences that always accompany such actions are simply too far reaching to remain 
vague about. I am not propagating for a non-interventionist, pacifist US. The US has the tools, has the 
power and has the willingness to bring about positive change. These tools should be employed, but only 
for the good, and the good that a military action might bring should be well established and supported by 
evidence. Sometimes, swift decision-making is necessary, for instance in the case of a direct and ongoing 
attack. But rarely has the US been in such a pressing situation to make an overnight order by the President 
to invade a country a justified action. 
A more critical stance on official discourse employed even by the most progressive politicians should 
be the norm. The IR scholarly community could take some lessons of critical journalism, especially with 
the way in which the debate around policy relevance seems to stagnate. Viewing justification-discourse in 
a more constructivist manner should be something of a second nature for politicians, at the least. The US 
does not operate in a bubble, and for many of their military decisions they also build upon their allies 
(NATO) or the United Nations. Ultimately, the leaders of the allied countries have as much to say about 
their own intervention as the US has on theirs. Close and powerful allies such as the EU and Britain should 
work to function more as part of an external system of checks and balances, judging US policy direction 
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and decision-making, without falling for the initial discourse attached to it. An obstacle is that since WWII 
there seems to be a prevalent feeling of dependence on the US in Europe. But these sentiments begun to 
fade somewhat in 2017, following the Trump administration and Brexit, Angela Merkel said in an election 
speech that Europe should “take its faith into its own hands”.81  
Another factor highlighted by the constructivist perspective on political discourse is that is inherently 
more critical to the truthfulness or the lack thereof. A term that is gaining traction is that of post-truth or 
post-reality politics. It holds that the rift between politics and policy is becoming increasingly wide. It is a 
term that is primarily used within journalism but the scientific community should also take this term 
seriously. This is especially true for the scientific community whose main activity is analyzing and 
theorizing international politics. A more critical stance towards the truthfulness of political discourse 
should provide IR scholars with a more usable toolset of analysis which would also help with the highly 
debated ‘policy relevance’ of IR. 
A continuation of this ‘game of discourses’ was again introduced with the misuse of the so called 
‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In short, this doctrine is a countermovement on the unquestioned 
sovereignty of states. It is based around a double layer of mandatory state responsibilities. Firstly, a state 
has the responsibility to protect its own citizens against violence, famine and natural disasters. Secondly, 
whenever a state is deemed unable to fulfill this responsibility, the responsibility to protect is carried over 
to ‘the global community’.82 This promising doctrine that seemed to carry over the responsibility from the 
US and the NATO, to the UN was first put into practice during the Libyan intervention. At the request of 
the Arab League of Nations a US/NATO led coalition was formed to help stabilize the (first)83 Libyan civil 
war (2011) and to protect its people. But when the coalition once again went further than just the 
protection that the doctrine demanded and pushed for regime change it is no surprise that the doctrine 
of R2P has lost much of its initial ‘togetherness’ of the international community. R2P had become yet 
another discourse of justification for Western-led intervention.84 
This shows that a careful and critical examination of the discourse of intervention is paramount among 
Western politicians. When it comes to military intervention, the words and the actions of leaders can 
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rarely be united. Terms like peacebuilding, statebuilding, R2P, the spread of democracy, no-fly zones and 
stability creation sound very noble and on the ‘right side of history’. But these terms are just words, the 
actual actions that follow up on these words and the reasoning behind them will always stay hidden 
behind some form of secrecy, perhaps for all parties involved. To recognize this in its initial forms may be 
a step forward in the right direction.       
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Conclusion 
“There is a kind of violence within liberalism of the Lockean type which goes back to its origins in the violent 
politics of the Renaissance, in which liberty and warfare (both civil war and international conflict) were 
bound together.”85 
 
The main focus of this thesis has been the post-Cold War justification discourses for US military conflict. 
This starting point was chosen because the Cold War military actions of the United States are historically 
bound to the existence of ‘the one other superpower’, the Soviet Union. Some analysists at the time of 
the fall of the Soviet Union predicted that the US could now finally stop their costly arms race. However, 
the US military spending and development did not decrease and since the “new world order”, the US has 
had boots on the ground in three major campaigns and numerous other large- and small-scale military 
operations. I have attempted to approach the topic of the continuation of America’s military conduct from 
a discursive and constructive perspective. The question I set out to answer in this thesis was the following: 
How did the discourses of justification of military action develop from the end of the Cold War until and 
including the War on Terror? I found part of this answer in the analysis of post-Cold War speeches by 
George H. W. Bush and Secretary Baker that occurred shortly after the SU had fallen. My aim was to 
analyze in what way a transition was attempted towards different sets of genres or frames of justification 
with regards to the first post-Cold War military action: the (sudden) Invasion of Panama. The justification 
discourse that was used for the Invasion of Panama was all over the place and when looking at critical 
literature concerning the Invasion of Panama none of the stated reasons are seem truly credible. From 
this I opted the possibility that the discourse on the Panama Invasion was primarily designed to probe 
what genre of discourse would prove to be enduring for public opinion in the long run. In the case of 
Panama this was the principle of democracy promotion which I placed in the genre of nobility. The 
following presidency of Bill Clinton initially made extensive usage of this genre of justification but it 
ultimately also lost its semiotic power.  
That is where the war on terror comes into play. How horrible the events of 9/11 may have been, they 
did provide for a perfect pretext of US military action in at least the two decennia thereafter, until this 
day. The accompanying discourse analysis was that of speeches delivered George W. Bush, in which he 
justifies coming and past military action. Within this context, George W. Bush also utilized different genres 
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of justification but it all boiled down to the relatively simple context of the necessity of the Global War on 
Terror. 
It is easy to say and think that the liberal states of the West are ‘on the right side of history’, since it 
often comes down emotionally to a conflict between the good of democracy and the bad of dictatorial 
regimes. In this thesis I attempted to put the words of US world leaders that have decided on some far 
reaching military action, in a perspective that emphasizes their discursive, semiotic and valorizing function 
within society, rather than the political message they attempt to bring across or the actual truths and 
untruths of their words. My main focus was not to look how these speeches and justification discourses 
would hold true, but rather at what kind of sentiments are constructed, created or magnified. I did not 
look at these speeches from a policy standpoint, but from a social standpoint; how can the public be 
convinced to become supportive for the initial phases of coming wars? 
Whether motives to go to war are strategic, ideational or economical, or all of the above, is hard to 
tell. It is difficult to find out ‘the true’ (may there even be such a thing) motives behind military conflict 
due to the sheer size of organizations involved. We cannot find out whether the securitization discourses 
real threat of terrorism is consciously designed to convince both the decision makers and the public of the 
right way forward, a way forwards that seems to usually involve a large role for the military. There is no 
way to retrace the existence of these discourses back to a particular political body. However, we do can 
inform both public and policymakers that the discursive dynamics are deceptive, and that presented 
threats should also be considered in a more constructivist perspective. During the writing of this thesis I 
have also found how difficult it is to find relevant literature within International Relations that focuses on 
the truthfulness political discourse, or the ethical or moral aspect of policy. That not all the language of 
politicians should be believed is a generally accepted claim, but the influence of this untruthfulness is 
hardly ever written about, while it seems such an important part of the information that IR scholars should 
be using: political discourse. There is a term for this notion of the ambivalence of political discourse: post-
truth or post-reality politics and it is gaining traction on a whole. However, more IR research on this topic 
is needed since it is also an important factor in the ‘policy-relevance’ debate that is always going on within 
IR. When politics and policy become more and more disconnected it will become increasingly hard to 
construct valuable and usable theories and analyses on international politics. These propositions are 
worthy of more inquiry.          
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - George H.W. Bush’s addresses the Nation on the Panama invasion, December 
20th 1989. 86 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
86 George H. W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Panama Invasion’, retrieved from 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ghwbushpanamainvasion.htm, 02-04-2018. 
§1 My fellow citizens, last night I ordered U.S. military forces to Panama. No President takes such 
action lightly. This morning, I want to tell you what I did and why I did it. For nearly two years, the 
United States, nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have worked together to resolve the 
crisis in Panama.  
 
§2 The goals of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend 
democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal 
Treaty. Many attempts have been made to resolve this crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. 
All were rejected by the dictator of Panama, Gen. Manuel Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker. 
 
§3 Last Friday, Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United 
States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. The very next day forces under 
his command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman, wounded another, arrested and 
brutally beat a third American serviceman and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her 
with sexual abuse. That was enough.  
 
§4 General Noriega's reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama created an eminent 
danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama. As President, I have no higher obligation than 
to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our armed force to protect 
the lives of American citizens in Panama, and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United 
States. I contacted the bipartisan leadership of Congress last night and informed them of this 
decision, and after taking this action, I also talked with leaders in Latin America, the Caribbean, 
and those of other U.S. allies Lifting of U.S. Sanctions  
 
§5 At this moment, U.S. forces, including forces deployed from the United States last night, are 
engaged in action in Panama. The United States intends to withdraw the forces newly deployed 
to Panama as quickly as possible. All forces have conducted themselves courageously and 
selflessly, and as Commander in Chief, I salute every one of them and thank them on behalf of our 
country. Tragically, some Americans have lost their lives in defense of their fellow citizens, in 
defense of democracy, and my heart goes out to their families. We also regret and mourn the loss 
of innocent Panamanians.  
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§6 The brave Panamanians elected by the people of Panama in the elections last May, President 
Guillermo Endara and Vice Presidents Calderon and Ford have assumed the rightful leadership of 
their country. You remember those horrible pictures of newly-elected Vice President Ford covered 
head to toe with blood, beaten mercilessly by so-called dignity battalions. Well, the United States 
today recognizes the democratically elected Government of President Endara. 
I will send our Ambassador back to Panama immediately. 
 
§7 Key military objectives have been achieved. Most organized resistance has been eliminated, 
but the operation is not over yet: General Noriega is in hiding. And nevertheless, yesterday a 
dictator ruled Panama, and today constitutionally elected leaders govern. 
 
§8 I have today directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State to lift the 
economic sanctions with respect to the democratically elected government of Panama and, in 
cooperation with that government, to take steps to effect an orderly unblocking of Panamanian 
Government assets in the United States. I'm fully committed to implement the Panama Canal 
treaties and turn over the Canal to Panama in the year 2000. The actions we have taken and the 
cooperation of a new, democratic government in Panama will permit us to honor these 
commitments. As soon as the new government recommends a qualified candidate -- Panamanian 
-- to be Administrator of the Canal, as called for in the treaties, I will submit this nominee to the 
Senate for expedited consideration. 
  
§9 I am committed to strengthening our relationship with the democratic nations in this 
hemisphere. I will continue to seek solutions to the problems of this region through dialogue and 
multilateral diplomacy.  
 
§10 I took this action only after reaching the conclusion that every other avenue was closed and 
the lives of American citizens were in grave danger. I hope that the people of Panama will put this 
dark chapter of dictatorship behind them and move forward together as citizens of a democratic 
Panama with this Government that they themselves have elected.  
 
§11 The United States is eager to work with the Panamanian people in partnership and friendship 
to rebuild their economy. The Panamanian people want democracy, peace, and the chance for a 
better life in dignity and freedom. The people of the United States seek only to support them in 
pursuit of these noble goals.  
 
Thank you very much. 
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Appendix 2 - Secretary Baker’s Adress before the World Affairs Council March 30, 1990.87 
 
                                                          
87 James Baker, “Democracy and American Diplomacy” in Department of State Dispatch 1 (1990) 18. 
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Appendix 3 – George W. Bush’s Iraq Ultimatum Speech88 
 
  
                                                          
88 George W. Bush, ‘Transcript of The Iraq Ultimatum Speech’, The Guardian retrieved from  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq 01-06-2018. 
§1 My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision. For more than a decade, 
the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime 
without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all its weapons of mass destruction as a condition 
for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991. 
 
§2 Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen 
resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to 
oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith has not been returned. 
 
§3 The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied 
Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapon inspectors have 
been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged, and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to 
disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again -- because we are not dealing with peaceful men. 
 
§4 Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to 
possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons 
of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people. 
 
§5 The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and 
our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger 
is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the 
terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent 
people in our country, or any other. 
 
§6 The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do 
everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before 
the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed. 
 
§7The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national 
security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep. 
Recognizing the threat to our country, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to 
support the use of force against Iraq. America tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat 
because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. We believe in the mission of the United Nations. One 
reason the UN was founded after the second world war was to confront aggressive dictators, actively and 
early, before they can attack the innocent and destroy the peace. 
 
§8 In the case of Iraq, the Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 687 - 
both still in effect - the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons 
of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will. 
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§9 Last September, I went to the U.N. General Assembly and urged the nations of the world to unite and 
bring an end to this danger. On November 8, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, 
finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully and 
immediately disarm. 
 
§10 Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam 
Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half months, the United States and our allies have worked 
within the Security Council to enforce that Council's long-standing demands. Yet, some permanent 
members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the 
disarmament of Iraq. These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet 
it. Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace, and a 
broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. The United Nations Security 
Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours. 
 
§11 In recent days, some governments in the Middle East have been doing their part. They have delivered 
public and private messages urging the dictator to leave Iraq, so that disarmament can proceed peacefully. 
He has thus far refused. All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein 
and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, 
commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals - including journalists and 
inspectors - should leave Iraq immediately. 
 
§12 Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we 
must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not 
against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We 
will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. 
In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, 
no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. 
The day of your liberation is near. 
§13 It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power. It is not too late for the Iraqi military to act with 
honor and protect your country by permitting the peaceful entry of coalition forces to eliminate weapons 
of mass destruction. Our forces will give Iraqi military units clear instructions on actions they can take to 
avoid being attacked and destroyed. I urge every member of the Iraqi military and intelligence services, if 
war comes, do not fight for a dying regime that is not worth your own life. 
§14 And all Iraqi military and civilian personnel should listen carefully to this warning. In any conflict, your 
fate will depend on your action. Do not destroy oil wells, a source of wealth that belongs to the Iraqi 
people. Do not obey any command to use weapons of mass destruction against anyone, including the Iraqi 
people. War crimes will be prosecuted. War criminals will be punished. And it will be no defense to say, "I 
was just following orders." 
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§15 Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has 
been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it. Americans understand the costs of 
conflict because we have paid them in the past. War has no certainty, except the certainty of sacrifice. 
§16 Yet, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our 
military, and we are prepared to do so. If Saddam Hussein attempts to cling to power, he will remain a 
deadly foe until the end. In desperation, he and terrorists groups might try to conduct terrorist operations 
against the American people and our friends. These attacks are not inevitable. They are, however, possible. 
And this very fact underscores the reason we cannot live under the threat of blackmail. The terrorist threat 
to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed. 
§17 Our government is on heightened watch against these dangers. Just as we are preparing to ensure 
victory in Iraq, we are taking further actions to protect our homeland. In recent days, American authorities 
have expelled from the country certain individuals with ties to Iraqi intelligence services. Among other 
measures, I have directed additional security of our airports, and increased Coast Guard patrols of major 
seaports. The Department of Homeland Security is working closely with the nation's governors to increase 
armed security at critical facilities across America. 
§18 Should enemies strike our country, they would be attempting to shift our attention with panic and 
weaken our morale with fear. In this, they would fail. No act of theirs can alter the course or shake the 
resolve of this country. We are a peaceful people - yet we're not a fragile people, and we will not be 
intimidated by thugs and killers. If our enemies dare to strike us, they and all who have aided them, will 
face fearful consequences. 
§19 We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five years, the 
power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these 
capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they 
are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our 
skies and cities. 
§20 The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In the 20th 
century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide 
and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of 
appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth. 
§21 Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations - and 
responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. The security 
of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now. 
§22 As we enforce the just demands of the world, we will also honor the deepest commitments of our 
country. Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty. 
And when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful 
and self-governing nation. 
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§23 The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our 
goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is 
felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, 
and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace. 
§24 That is the future we choose. Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the 
violent. And tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept that responsibility. 
Good night, and may God continue to bless America. 
 
 
